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FOOTING THE BILL FOR A SOUND BASIC 
EDUCATION IN NEW YORK CITY: THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL 
EQUITY V. STATE∗
Bonnie A. Scherer 
 
“In whatever way a man sets out in his education, such accordingly will 
be its consequences.”1
INTRODUCTION 
 
A democratic society has a vested interest in a well educated populous.  
Educated citizens are capable of forming a productive workforce and 
actively participating in the electoral process.2  Individuals without a high 
school diploma are significantly less likely to find meaningful employment 
and lead economically stable lives in today’s economy.3  Most states, in 
order to promote an educated citizenry, provide for some form of adequate 
education under their respective state constitutions.  The New York State 
Constitution dictates that “[t]he Legislature shall provide for the 
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools wherein all 
the children of this state may be educated.”4
On March 16, 2005, in what appeared to be a victory for the children of 
New York City, the Court of Appeals of New York, applying the Education 
Article, upheld a lower court decision and recommendation, by a panel of 
judicially appointed Special Referees, holding that the New York State 
 
 
∗ B.S., Boston University, 2003; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2006.  
I would like to thank my family, friends, and Aaron for their unwavering support and 
patience.  
 1. Plato, The Republic, in THE WORKS OF PLATO 1, 136 (Henry Davis M.A. 
trans.,Tudor Publishing Company 1933). 
 2. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 484-85 (Sup. Ct. 
2001). 
 3. Id. at 487. 
 4. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
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school funding system failed to provide New York City children with a 
“sound basic education.”5  The Court of Appeals mandated that the State 
Legislature phase in $5.6 billion annually, as well as an additional $9.2 
billion in a capital fund to reform the City public schools.6  The opinion, 
however, failed to address one key question: where will the money come 
from?  Members of the State government, including Governor George 
Pataki, indicate that New York City should be responsible for forty percent 
of the bill.7  Local officials, such as Mayor Michael Bloomberg, insist that 
providing a sound basic education is the responsibility of state government, 
that the State should pay for the entire amount, and that any effort by the 
City to contribute will result in the loss of other programs that support 
children, as well as public safety.8  The only guidance provided by an 
otherwise activist court was that the City may be responsible for a 
reasonable portion of education-related expenses and that the State may not 
overburden the City to the point where it cannot provide the funds.9
Part I of this Comment will first demonstrate various approaches in 
narrowing the achievement gap between wealthy and poor students under 
federal and state constitutional schemes over the past fifty years.  Part I will 
further delineate the relative successes and failures in implementing 
education finance reform in various states.  Lastly, Part I will explore the 
unique education system in  New York City and education finance reform 
in New York State over the last few decades, focusing on the multiple 
judicial proceedings in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State. 
 
Part II will detail conflicting opinions on how and by whom a sound 
basic education for the children of New York City shall be funded under 
the mandate of Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State.  Part II will 
further explore the argument that the judiciary lacked the authority to 
delegate $5.6 billion to provide a sound basic education.  Part III will show 
how extreme solutions are unlikely to survive the political process and how 
the Court of Appeals’ most recent decision in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 
Inc. v. State leaves the door open for potentially endless litigation without 
timely benefit for the children in the New York City Public School System.  
Part III will also demonstrate how public engagement on where sound basic 
 
 5. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 
2005), available at http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/degrassefinalorder031505.pdf. 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Michael Cooper & David M. Herszenhorn, It’s Time to Pay the School Bill, But No 
One’s Volunteering, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at B4. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Report and Recommendations of the Judicial Referees at § IV, ¶ 87, Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/RefereesFinalReport11.30.04.pdf. 
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education funds should come from and additional educational reforms, in 
addition to increased funding, are needed to ensure that the New York City 
schools provide constitutionally mandated sound basic education to its 
students. 
PART I: PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION FOR ALL 
CHILDREN: 
THE COMPLEX HISTORY OF EDUCATION FINANCE REFORM 
LITIGATION IN NEW YORK AND ACROSS THE UNITED 
STATES 
In order to understand the current state of school finance, it is necessary 
to first look at the history of education finance reform litigation over the 
last fifty years.  In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, the Supreme 
Court held that if government chooses to take on the job of educating its 
citizenry it must do so equally, or not at all.10  Brown was only the first of 
many cases brought to promote education reform, a trend that continues 
today, over half a century later.11  First, individuals attempted to bring 
federal equity claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.12  When this 
approach failed, plaintiffs seeking education reform brought similar cases 
under state constitutions and using equal protection arguments.13  The 
current wave of education reform cases seek to challenge whether states are 
providing an adequate education to all students, as guaranteed by the 
education articles of many state constitutions.14
A. Federal Equity Claims 
 
Immediately following Brown, in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, advocates 
of education finance reform brought cases under the Fourteenth 
Amendment utilizing a theory of fiscal neutrality.15
 
 10. See 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
  Advocates argued that 
 11. See Sara S. Erving, New York’s Education Finance Litigation and the Title VI Wave: 
An Analysis of Campaign for Fiscal Equality v. State, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 271, 279-82 (2001) 
(observing that Brown was the first of three waves of education finance reform). 
 12. See Damian V. Gosheff, Comment, Brown’s Unfulfilled Promise: Education 
Finance Reform and the Separate But Equal Effect of State Education Clause Remedies: 
New York as a Model, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 889, 890 (2004). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 891 (citing William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of 
School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 
600 (1994)). 
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equalizing educational spending would in turn equalize educational 
opportunities for all children, a right guaranteed under the Equal Protection 
Clause.16  Though the fiscal neutrality theory had early judicial support, the 
Supreme Court eventually struck down the argument that educational 
equality is a federally guaranteed right under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
ending the federal equity wave.17
The first case to address education finance reform under the federal 
Equal Protection Clause was Serrano v. Priest, in which the California 
Supreme Court declared that a funding scheme based on wealth of districts 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
 
18  In the wake of Priest, several other 
states faced similar suits under the Equal Protection Clause framework.19  
The success of Priest, however, was short-lived.  The United States 
Supreme Court, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
put an end to federal education funding litigation.20
Rodriguez addressed disparities in educational opportunities for low 
income students.
 
21  The Court, in analyzing the Texas system, held that 
education was not a fundamental right and, as such, was not entitled to 
heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause.22  Using a 
deferential scrutiny analysis, the Court stated that Texas’ tax-based system 
was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, and thus did 
not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
 
 16. See id. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no 
state may deny any citizen equal protection under the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
  The Court noted that issues 
 17. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973). 
 18. 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971).  The Priest court, using a fiscal neutrality analysis, 
stated that California should base school funding on the wealth of the state as a whole, 
rather than the wealth of individual localities to ensure equality.  Id.; see also Gosheff, supra 
note 12, at 891 (citing Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A 
Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099, 1101 (1977)). 
 19. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 891.  Following the decision in Priest, similar suits 
were immediately filed in two-thirds of the states.  Id. 
 20. Id.; see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24. 
 21. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1. 
 22. See id. at 40.  All equal protection cases ask whether there is a sufficient purpose to 
justify a particular classification.  Under a strict scrutiny analysis, used for discrimination 
based on race or national origin, the government must show that the means is “necessary to 
achieve a compelling purpose.”  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES § 9.1.2 (2d ed. 2002).  Under heightened, or intermediate scrutiny, the 
government must show that a law is substantially related to achieving an important 
governmental purpose.  Under a rational basis test, or deferential scrutiny, the government 
only needs to show that a law is rationally related to achieving a legitimate government 
purpose.  This is the easiest burden to bear, and laws are rarely invalidated under the rational 
basis test.  Id. 
 23. Id.  The Court noted that there may be an equal protection issue if the children in 
poor districts were deprived of an education, but such was not the case.  See Gosheff, supra 
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of school finance and state and local property taxes were beyond the scope 
of federal authority.24  The Court’s analysis ended federal claims based on 
unequal educational funding.25
B. State Equity Claims 
 
After Rodriguez, advocates for equal educational financing were forced 
to look beyond the federal law.26  Seeking relief under a different statutory 
scheme, plaintiffs brought substantially similar education finance claims 
under state constitutions.27  Initially, defining education as a fundamental 
right under state constitution frameworks, rather than federal law, seemed 
to yield enhanced potential for education reform.28  But courts have 
interpreted state equity claims with varying results.29
Within a decade of Rodriguez, courts became increasingly reluctant to 
sustain state equity claims,
   
30 requiring plaintiffs to meet one of two 
standards in order to prove that a school financing scheme violated the 
respective state constitution.31  First, the plaintiff could show that wealth-
based financing was discriminatory, and as such required heightened 
scrutiny.32
 
note 12, at 891-92. 
  The courts did not want to label wealth as a suspect class, 
 24. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40-41 (1973). 
 25. Avidan Y. Cover, Note, Is “Adequacy” a More “Political Question” Than 
“Equality?” The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education, 
11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 409 (2002). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  Education is at least implicitly mentioned in nearly all state constitutions, 
meeting the requirement that a right be implicitly or explicitly found in the text of the 
constitution in order to be considered a fundamental right.  There is no mention of education 
in the U.S. Constitution.  Id.; see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1. 
 29. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 892.  Some states adhered closely to the federal equal 
protection analyses, courts only found against the state in question if they broadly construed 
the standard to include education as a fundamental right.  Meanwhile, other states created 
their own state-specific equal protection analyses, resulting in a wide variety of results.  
Plaintiffs prevailed in Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Tennessee, and Wyoming.  Other 
states either denied claims or refused to hear them at all.  Id. at 892-93 (citing Dupree v. 
Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 
1255 (Cal. 1971), appeal after remand, 557 P.2d 929, 953 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill, 
376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 
139, 152 (Tenn. 1993); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 315 
(Wyo. 1980)). 
 30. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 892 (citing Brian J. Nickerson & Gerard M. 
Deenihan, From Equity to Adequacy: The Legal Battle for Increased State Funding of Poor 
School Districts in New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1341, 1349 (2003)). 
 31. Id. at 893. 
 32. Id. 
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deserving of heightened scrutiny.33  Several state programs, including 
Medicaid, used wealth, or a lack of wealth, to determine eligibility.34  
Defining wealth as a suspect class would put the legality of such programs 
in serious danger.35  In the alternative, courts required plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that the current system failed to pass a rational basis analysis, 
a difficult burden to bear.36
Furthermore, state equity claims indicated that a redistribution of wealth 
was necessary to provide an equal education to all children.
 
37  In other 
words, the financing available to wealthier districts would have to be 
lowered in order to support poorer districts.38  Such redistribution of wealth 
met furious opposition as a counter-capitalist ideal.39
The state equity trend dissipated and education reformers were forced to 
seek a third avenue to address school financing disparities: bringing actions 
under the education articles of many state constitutions. 
 
C. State Adequacy Claims under the Education Article 
Currently, plaintiffs bring educational inadequacy claims under the 
education articles of their respective state constitutions.40  Virtually every 
state has an education article in its constitution that guarantees some form 
of free public education.41  Using the education articles, as opposed to 
either state or federal equal protection clauses, shifts the focus from the 
unequal funding a poorer school district receives to the question of what 
such funding provides, or fails to provide, for students.42
 
 33. Id. (citing Quentin A. Palfrey, The State Judiciary’s Role in Fulfilling Brown’s 
Promise, 8 MICH J. RACE & L. 1, 20-21 (2002)). 
  Thus, the theory 
 34. Id. at 894; see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that 
rational basis review is appropriate for wealth-based classification).  In Dandridge, the 
Supreme Court accepted the state’s interest in allocating limited state funds for public 
assistance as a rational basis to justify a cap on welfare benefits regardless of family size.  
Id. 
 35. Gosheff, supra note 12, at 894-95. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (citing Palfrey, supra note 33, at 18). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Deborah Verstegen & Robert Knoeppel, Equal Education Under the Law: 
School Finance Reform and the Courts, 14 J.L.& POL. 555, 558-59 (1998). 
 41. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art XI, § 1; see also William E. 
Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 
EDUC. L. REP. 19, 19 (1993) (observing that every state except Mississippi has an Education 
Article). 
 42. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 895 (citing Nickerson & Deenihan, supra note 30, at 
1355). 
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indicates that while unequal funding may not be inherently 
unconstitutional, disparate effects of unequal funding violate the guarantee 
of the states’ respective education articles.43
Typically, in addressing adequacy claims, a court establishes a minimum 
obligation guaranteed under the education article of the particular state.  
This minimum obligation serves as a “constitutional floor.”
 
44  The court 
then looks to see if the state is meeting its minimum burden.45  If the court 
determines that the state is failing to meet the standard set out in its 
constitution, the court must then determine whether there is a causal link 
between disparate financing and failure to meet the standard.46
i.  New Jersey and the Abbot Mandate 
  Courts 
have applied this analysis with varying results. 
It took twenty-five years, ten New Jersey Supreme Court opinions, three 
legislative overhauls, and a failing education system to prompt the New 
Jersey Supreme Court to take drastic action to remedy their school finance 
system.47  New Jersey first tried to correct disparities in educational 
financing with the Public School Education Act of 1975 (“PSEA”).48  In 
Abbott v. Burke II, the court held that the PSEA violated the New Jersey 
constitution as it applied to several low income districts (hereinafter, the 
“Abbott districts”).49  The legislature, in response to Abbott II, enacted the 
Quality Education Act of 1990 (“QEA”) to ensure “substantially 
equivalent” per pupil expenditures and money to address specific 
disadvantages.50  Despite the legislature’s efforts the QEA never came to 
realize its goals.51
 
 43. Id. 
 
 44. Gosheff, supra note 12, at 896. 
 45. Id. at 897. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s 
Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615, 620-26 
(2004). 
 48. Id. at 620. 
 49. Id. at 621 (citing Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990)).  The 
twenty-eight Abbott districts comprised approximately twenty-five percent of New Jersey’s 
public school system.  See Erain Applewhite & Lesley Hirsch, Educ. Law Ctr., The Abbott 
Preschool Program: Fifth Year Report on Enrollment and Budget (Oct. 2003), available at 
www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/Publications/PDF/PreschoolFifthYearReport.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2005). 
 50. Greif, supra note 47, at 621.  The original QEA also included increased state aid to 
the Abbott districts, a phase-out of wealthy district aid, and a reduction in state aid for 
teachers’ pension plans.  Id. 
 51. Id. at 622. 
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Subject to the pressures of interest groups, New Jersey’s teacher 
organizations, and suburban voters, the New Jersey Legislature chose to 
replace the QEA with the Quality of Education Act of 1991 (“QEA II”), a 
significantly more lenient version of the original.52  Politicians who 
supported the original QEA, including Governor Jim Florio, fell victim to 
the electoral process and failed to win re-election.  The judiciary eventually 
responded.  In Abbott III the judiciary declared the QEA II unconstitutional 
because it failed to ensure parity funding.  The judiciary gave the 
legislature a year to devise a new, constitutional funding scheme.53
At the time of Abbott III, the legislature, which was controlled by a 
Republican majority and was often persuaded by the new, highly 
conservative Governor, Christine Todd Whitman, failed to comply with the 
court’s mandate.
 
54  Instead, the legislature enacted the Comprehensive 
Educational Improvement and Financing Act (“CEIFA”), which did not 
provide for parity funding and focused on a model school formula rather 
than inputs and outputs.55  The CEIFA failed, and the court in Abbott IV 
remanded the case to the New Jersey Superior Court for a hearing to 
determine the cost of funding to provide a constitutionally adequate 
education to the students in the Abbott districts.56  The Superior Court, in 
Abbott V, issued a report recommending whole-school reform, full day pre-
kindergarten, full day kindergarten, summer school, school-based health 
and social services, a program of fiscal and academic accountability, and 
added social security.57  The court estimated these reforms would cost an 
additional $312 million per year.58
Implementation of the Abbott V mandate, however, came at a slower 
pace than expected.  This brought into question with the widely held notion 
that school finance reform failed in the past because broad judicial 
remedies allowed state legislatures to avoid making significant changes.
 
59
 
 52. Id. 
  
Though Abbott implemented a specific timetable for reform, deadlines 
were not met, and reforms came somewhat slower than proponents 
 53. Id. at 622-23 (citing Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994)).  This 
process bears a striking similarity to the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State line of cases, 
under which the legislature was also given a year to correct educational inadequacies and 
failed.  See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 100 N.Y.2d. 893, 947 (2003). 
 54. Greif, supra note 47, at 623 (citing Abbott v. Burke (“Abbott IV”), 693 A.2d 417, 
436-37 (N.J. 1997)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 456. 
 57. Greif, supra note 47, at 615. 
 58. Abbott v. Burke (”Abbott V”), 710 A.2d 450, 515 (N.J. 1998). 
 59. Greif, supra note 47, at 615-16. 
SCHERERCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:07 PM 
2005 SOUND BASIC EDUCATION 109 
expected or desired.60
Implementation of the Abbott V mandate was slow in part because it was 
met with interference both from the executive and legislative branches of 
the New Jersey government, despite the court’s specific instructions.
 
61  The 
judicial remedies lacked public and political support, and were decried by 
some as a grossly inappropriate expansion of the court’s powers.62  This 
resistance proved to be a key barrier to school-based reform, and changes 
only began to materialize after administrative changes at the executive 
level and a shift in public opinion.63
Though the judiciary detailed remedies through the Abbott V mandate, it 
still entrusted a lot of general responsibility to the state legislature.
 
64  This 
proved fatal, as the executive branch, openly opposed to urban school 
reform, exerted pressure on the legislature to redefine what was necessary 
to provide a thorough and efficient education, in order to minimize 
government spending.  The election of a new governor in 2002, however, 
helped change the tide of school finance reform in New Jersey.65
The legislature, apart from executive pressure, put up its own barriers to 
the implementation of the Abbott V mandate.
 
66  Suburban districts, which 
composed a large part of New Jersey’s electorate, slowed the process 
because they were not willing to pay more in taxes without seeing any 
benefit in their schools.67  Furthermore, the legislature resisted the Abbott V 
mandate as an unfair encroachment on their power to determine how to 
spend the tax-payer’s money, especially considering the requirement that 
all of the money come from state funding, rather than local contributions.68
 
 60. Id. at 626. 
  
Lastly, the Abbott V mandate faced logistical difficulties and a changing 
 61. Id. at 628. 
 62. Id. at 628-43. 
 63. Id. at 638, 640-41. 
 64. Id. at 629-30. 
 65. Id.  New Jersey elected James McGreevey as Governor in 2002.  He was much more 
receptive to education reform than his predecessor. Id. at 638-40. 
 66. Id. at 639-40. 
 67. Id.  As Senator Joseph Palaia noted, “[T]alking about thirty Abbott districts as 
opposed to [616] school districts in the state of New Jersey, so you know that others aren’t 
going to be thrilled that the biggest pot of all is going to the thirty districts.”  Id.  The 
suburban districts also wanted funding for construction projects, arguing that because of a 
large imbalance in state funding they also needed government help.  Id.  On June 5, 2000 
both houses of the New Jersey legislature agreed the non-Abbott districts would receive a 
minimum of forty percent funding to cover their construction and facilities needs.  Id. (citing 
Randy Diamond, Legislature Far Apart on School Funding, BERGEN REC., Mar. 9, 2000, at 
A3). 
 68. See Greif, supra note 47, at 642. 
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economy that hindered reform.69
Though implementation of the Abbott V mandate was slower than 
expected, it was not necessarily a failure.  School reform continues to be a 
major issue in New Jersey, and campaigns to improve public opinion on 
urban school funding give hope to meaningful reform.
 
70
ii. Judicial Activism and Failure in West Virginia 
 
The story of school finance reform in West Virginia differs somewhat 
from New Jersey in that it began in a small rural district rather than a large 
urban system.71  Like the children in New Jersey, the children in West 
Virginia were not receiving their constitutionally guaranteed education 
under the education article.72  Following several rounds of litigation, in an 
unusual display of judicial activism, the judiciary in West Virginia declared 
the school finance system unconstitutional and mandated very specific 
reforms.73  In a supplemental opinion by Judge Recht, the court provided 
extremely detailed remedies, including such detail as how many rooms in a 
school should be designated for art classes.74
The reforms in West Virginia were by and large unsuccessful and failed 
to benefit the children.  Two decades after Judge Recht’s supplemental 
opinion, change was still stagnant and costs were upwards of $1.2 billion.
 
75  
The reforms came at a difficult time in the State’s economy and the 
government needed to cut spending.76
 
 69. Id. at 643-52. 
  The courts, however, blocked any 
 70. Id. at 656. 
 71. See Jonathan R. Werner, Note, No Knight in Shining Armor: Why Courts Alone, 
Absent Public Engagement, Could Not Achieve Successful Public School Finance Reform in 
West Virginia, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 61 (2002). 
 72. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979); see also Pauley v. Bailey, No. 
75-1268 (Kanawha Co. Cir., W. Va., May 11, 1982) (outlining Judge Recht’s plan for 
judicial overhaul of the education system set forth on remand to the trial court); Werner, 
supra note 71, at 68-72. 
 73. See Werner, supra note 71, at 71.  Judge Recht’s plan, entitled Components of a 
Thorough and Efficient System of Free Schools Within Specific Educational Offerings, listed 
details such as one-hundred minutes per week of art education, with one art room for every 
350-400 students, measuring at least sixty-five square feet of work area per pupil.  This 
level of specificity permeated the entire decision.  Pauley v. Bailey, No. 75-1268 (Kanawha 
Co. Cir., W.Va., May 11, 1982). 
 74. Pauley v. Bailey, No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Co. Cir., W. Va., May 11, 1982). 
 75. See Werner, supra note 71, at 73-74, 76.  Judge Recht issued a supplemental opinion 
shortly after the decision, in part to calm public opinion, stating that the court did not have 
the power to demand that the legislature adopt his plan under the separation of powers 
doctrine.  Pauley v. Bailey, No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Co. Cir., W. Va., May 11, 1982). 
 76. See Werner, supra note 71, at 68 (citing Richard Meckley, Court Grants Education 
a Preferred Funding Status in West Virginia, 7 J. EDUC. FIN. 227 (1981)). 
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cuts in education spending, creating a rift between the branches of the 
government.77  The public was split between those that hailed the court’s 
opinion as a victory for children, and those that felt it was an 
unconstitutional act of judicial activism.78  Such polarity was pervasive 
throughout the public and the government, and prevented any actual reform 
from materializing.79  The different branches of government fought one 
another’s efforts at every step, using the checks and balances process to 
prevent funding changes and educational reform measures from taking 
effect.80
iii. Kentucky as a Model of Success 
 
While judiciary-imposed reform in New Jersey and West Virginia met 
significant resistance from the executive and legislative branches as well as 
the public, in Kentucky, public engagement, prior to the implementation of 
reform, ensured a more successful result.81
As was the case in other states, legislative results did not come fast 
enough in Kentucky and a coalition of poor districts brought suit against 
the state for failing to provide a constitutionally guaranteed education.
 
82  
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Rose v. Council for Better Education, 
Inc., declared the entire education system in Kentucky unconstitutional.83  
In response to this decision, the legislature quickly enacted the Kentucky 
Education Reform Act (KERA) which changed how the school system was 
governed and financed.84  Under KERA, Kentucky raised approximately 
$1.6 billion for school finance in two years.85
KERA’s success was largely attributable to a grass-roots campaign 
which laid the foundation for reform before the legislation was actually 
introduced.
 
86
 
 77. Id. (citing Meckley, supra note 76). 
  The Prichard Committee, which consisted of parents, 
 78. Werner, supra note 71, at 72. 
 79. See generally Werner, supra note 71. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See generally Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Policy and Students’ 
Opportunities to Learn: Kentucky’s Experience, 7 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 79 (1997), 
available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/vol7no3ART6.pdf. 
 82. See Werner, supra note 71, at 65. 
 83. Id. (citing Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)). 
 84. Werner, supra note 71, at 66. 
 85. See Adams, supra note 81, at 81-82. 
 86. Werner, supra note 71, at 66.  The Prichard Committee was a reflection of support 
throughout Kentucky.  Furthermore, business leaders agreed to contribute financially and to 
pay higher taxes if the legislature substantially changed the school system.  Public support 
for increased taxes to improve the education system also helped to lay the foundation for 
successful reform.  Furthermore, the state’s largest education union, the Kentucky Education 
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politicians, local media outlets, and business leaders, rallied support for 
substantial changes to the school system.87  By 1993, KERA reduced the 
relationship between a school district’s wealth and the amount of revenue 
its students received by fifty-five percent, allowing for greater equity 
throughout the system.88  Over the next decade, Kentucky continued to 
reduce funding disparities between poor and wealthy districts.89
Kentucky’s reform initiative did not come without opposition.  
Researchers identified five significant challenges to Kentucky’s reform 
initiative: 
 
 
(1) to create capacity at all levels of the education system, 
(2) to implement the various components of reform in a reasonable 
sequence,  
(3) to avoid recreating a stifling top-down bureaucracy,  
(4) to foster the public and professional support needed to change over 
time, and, 
 (5) to develop mechanisms for continuous learning and adaptation.90
 
 
Though Kentucky was successful in increasing revenue and decreasing 
disparities in its districts, the percentage of total spending allocated to 
instruction actually decreased from approximately seventy-two percent to 
seventy percent.91  This slowed the actual progress of new finance 
structures, but progress is ongoing and Kentucky stands as a model of 
success from which other states can learn and improve upon.92  The failure 
to change allocations in Kentucky is important to consider when 
implementing reform in New York. 93
 
Association also supported reform.  All collaborative efforts occurred before the case was 
even filed in the lower court.  Id. 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Adams, supra note 81, at 81-85. 
 90. Id. at 91. 
 91. Id. at 82.  After reform, Kentucky’s spending patterns changed less than one percent 
with respect to administration, student services, transportation, operations, maintenance, 
fixed costs, and debt service.  Id. 
 92. See Werner, supra note 71, at 63. 
 93. See Raymond Domanico, No Strings Attached? Ensuring that “CFE” Funds are 
Spent Effectively, MANHATTAN INST. CIVIC REPORT NO. 42 (July 2004), available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_42.htm.  Between 1982 and 2002 the total 
revenues in New York nearly tripled, and the state’s share of funding in New York City 
increased.  Increased funding alone, however, did not translate into improved schools.  Id. 
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D. The New York State Aid System and the Unique Character of the 
New York City Public Schools 
New York uses a state aid formula to “equalize” state educational 
opportunity.94  The theory of the state aid formula is to ensure that all 
students receive the highest minimum possible with the available resources, 
without stunting the growth of communities that wish to contribute above 
the minimum.95  The state provides a base amount to all districts that is less 
than what is required to educate a child.96  State operating aid is then 
distributed on a formula based on property and income.97  Then the State 
computes Extraordinary Needs Aid, which assists children in districts with 
condensed poverty or low achievement levels.  Extraordinary Needs Aid 
includes: (1) a fund for special education, (2) per capita funding for 
textbooks and other instrumentalities, and, (3) aid for transportation and 
building.98  For the upcoming 2005-06 school year, the state will give New 
York City approximately $5.6 billion dollars in aid (an amount determined 
by the aforementioned formula), and an additional $140 million in special 
grant programs.99
Generally, New York City receives approximately thirty-nine percent of 
any operating aid increase from the State, otherwise known as the “state 
share.”
 
100  Regardless of state share, no district receives less than they did 
the year before, due to the “save harmless” provisions which guarantee 
districts with declining enrollment or changing wealth the same funding as 
the previous year.101  Even the wealthiest districts receive some form of 
state aid.102
There are several additional factors that lead to funding considerations in 
New York City.  The New York City schools have revenues of $12 billion, 
which equals allowing $11,165 per student.
 
103
 
 94. See Kent K. Anker, Differences and Dialogue: School Finance in New York State, 
24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 356 (1998). 
  This is significantly less 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. EDUC. UNIT, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF THE BUDGET, DESCRIPTION OF 2005-06 NEW YORK 
STATE EXECUTIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
EDUCATION 30 (2005) [hereinafter EDUCATION UNIT]. 
 98. Anker, supra note 94, at 356. 
 99. EDUCATION UNIT, supra note 97, at 30. 
 100. Anker, supra note 94, at 358. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, CAN NEW YORK GET AN A IN SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM? 
4-6 (Nov. 2004), at http://www.cbcny.org/CBC_School_Finance_Reform_11-04.pdf  
[hereinafter CBC REPORT]. 
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than the state school revenues of $35 billion, or $12,770 per student.104  
The federal government contributes less than ten percent of the funding for 
the New York City school system; the State contributes approximately 55.5 
percent, and the rest comes from local funding sources, including property 
taxes.105  The tax effort in New York City, however, is lower than the 
statewide average.106  New York State requires localities to contribute to 
payment for Medicaid, a high figure in New York City, which, coupled 
with the local tax effort, brings the City well above the statewide 
average.107
Moreover, children in New York City attend the largest school system in 
the country, which serves a population of 1.1 million students, in 
approximately 1,100 schools.
 
108  Over half of these schools are over fifty-
five years old, and thirty-eight percent require substantial improvements.109
The composure of the student body adds further to the uniqueness of the 
system.
 
110  There are 180 languages spoken amongst the children of New 
York City, and one in every eleven students is a recent immigrant.111  
Approximately seventy-three percent of New York State’s total minority 
student body attends a New York City public school.112  Additionally, 
sixteen percent of City children are classified as having limited English 
proficiency, meaning that they scored below the fortieth percentile on 
language assessment tests.113  Nearly half of the students come from 
families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and seventy-
three percent of students get free lunch, as compared to five percent in the 
rest of the State.114  Fifty-two percent of students in the City attend schools 
in which more than forty percent of their peers are poor, as compared with 
eleven percent of students outside of the Big Five Cities (Buffalo, New 
York, Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers).115
 
 104. Id. 
 
 105. Id.  The low federal contribution comes from the nation’s historic reliance on local 
control of schools and the absence of a public education role for the federal government in 
the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT K-12 EDUCATION FINDING, 
(2005), at http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/index.html. 
 106. CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 4-6. 
 107. Id.  New York City’s combined school and Medicaid tax effort significantly exceeds 
the statewide average: $16.70 per $1,000 versus $14.40 per $1,000.  Id. 
 108. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 488 (Sup. Ct. 2001). 
 109. Id. at 505. 
 110. Id. at 489-90. 
 111. Id. at 490. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  School lunch is an indicator of low income. Id. 
 115. See Anker, supra note 94, at 350. 
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Students in the City are also at a disadvantage with respect to teachers.  
Approximately ten-to-fourteen percent of teachers in New York City are 
not certified, as compared to the state average of four percent.116  The 
concentration of uncertified and inexperienced teachers is 
disproportionately high in poorer districts.117  Facilities and 
instrumentalities are also potential barriers to adequate education.  
Textbooks are frequently out of date, libraries insufficient, and access to 
computers limited.118  Lastly, class sizes in New York City are especially 
large.119  As a result, teacher attention on each child is notably limited.120
From an output perspective, only half of New York City ninth grade 
students graduate in four years.
 
121  Thirty percent of ninth graders never 
graduate at all, nor do they get their general equivalency diploma 
(G.E.D.)122  Out of the students that do graduate and go on to the City 
University of New York, eighty percent require remedial help in one or 
more major subjects, with approximately half of those students requiring 
help in multiple subjects.123
New York City children attend school in dilapidated buildings and are 
issued out-of-date textbooks and taught by inexperienced teachers, making 
it difficult to graduate.
 
124  This flawed system affects students’ abilities to 
gain an adequate education.125
E. New York’s Road to Adequacy in Education 
 
In February 2005, the Court of Appeals declared the New York school 
funding system, as it applies to New York City, invalid under the 
Education Article.126
 
 116. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 899-900. 
  After several stages of litigation and legislation, 
 117. See Domanico, supra note 93.  Teachers in New York City schools with high 
minority enrollments are on average less experienced and lower paid than teachers in 
schools with low minority enrollments.  Id.  This is unique to the New York City schools.  
Much of this allocation stems from the teachers’ contract, which states that vacant positions 
must be “filled by the most senior qualified applicant.”  Id.  The senior applicants tend to 
gravitate towards higher achieving districts in wealthier areas.  Id. 
 118. Anker, supra note 94, at 352. 
 119. Id. at 351. 
 120. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 901-02. 
 121. Id. at 902. “Only 50% of New York City Public School students who entered ninth 
grade in 1996, and who stayed in school, made it to twelfth grade in four years.” Id. at n. 
134. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 909-15 (2003). 
 126. Gosheff, supra note 12, at 897-98. 
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Justice DeGrasse of the Supreme Court of New York, in Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York (“CFE V”), declared that an annual 
increase of $5.6 billion is necessary to provide the children of the New 
York City public schools with the education guaranteed by the New York 
Constitution.127
New York’s road to CFE V followed the national trend.
 
128  In Levittown 
Union Free School District v. Nyquist, the court struck down both federal 
and state equity claims.129  The court indicated that the Education Article 
only guaranteed a “sound basic education”, and absent a “gross and glaring 
inadequacy” they would refrain from declaring a system invalid.130
R.E.F.I.T. v. Cuomo used the “sound basic education” language provided 
in Levittown, claiming that New York failed to provide a sound basic 
education under the Education Article because of unequal funding for 
minority students.
 
131  The plaintiffs in R.E.F.I.T. failed because they 
brought an equity claim, already determined to be invalid under Levittown, 
and attempted to disguise it as an adequacy issue.132
F. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State: Adequacy in the New York 
City Public School System. 
  The court did not take 
the opportunity to rule on adequacy in R.E.F.I.T., leaving the door open for 
the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State line of cases. 
The plaintiffs, in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, noting, the 
mistake in R.E.F.I.T., brought two separate causes of action.133  First, they 
claimed that the state violated the Education Article by utilizing a funding 
system which failed to provide a sound basic education to New York City 
students.134  Second, the Campaign for Fiscal Equity asserted that New 
York State’s method of financing the schools violated Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 because of the disparate impact that the funding system 
has on minority students.135
 
 127. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., v. State, No. 111070/93, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 2005), at 
http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/degrassefinalorder031505.pdf. 
  The New York State Constitution ensures that 
“[t]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a 
 128. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 898. 
 129. 439 N.E.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. 1982). 
 130. Id. at 369. 
 131. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.)  v. Cuomo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (App. 
Div. 1993), order aff’d as modified, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 283 (1995). 
 132. Gosheff, supra note 12, at 903. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
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system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may 
be educated.”136  As interpreted in Levittown, this clause guarantees a 
sound basic education.137
In 1995 the Court of Appeals, in the first Campaign for Fiscal Equity 
(“CFE”) case, set up a template to guide the district court in determining if 
the State violated its duty to provide a sound basic education to all children, 
and remanded the case.
 
138  The template defined a sound basic education as 
“the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable 
children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of 
voting and serving on a jury.”139  The district court was inherited with the 
task of evaluating inputs and outputs to see if the New York City schools 
met the sound basic education standard.140
 
  The inputs required were: 
(1) “[M]inimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic 
curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social 
studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject 
areas.”141
(2) “[M]inimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which 
provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn.”
 
142
(3) “[M]inimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, 
chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks.” 
 
143
 
 
The Campaign for Fiscal Equity assisted in defining a sound basic 
education through a collaborative effort which utilized community forums 
that brought together urban, rural and suburban residents, policy makers, 
and school officials.144  As a result of these forums, the CFE helped the 
court define the inputs necessary to provide a sound basic education, and 
determined that employment was an important goal of education.145
Based on the inputs determined by the court, with the help of CFE and 
additional output information which included test scores and graduation 
rates, the district court determined that New York’s school funding system 
failed to provide the students of New York City with a sound basic 
 
 
 136. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 137. Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48 (1982). 
 138. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 317 (1995) [hereinafter 
CFE I]. 
 139. Id. at 316. 
 140. Id. at 317. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Michael A. Rebell, Adequacy Litigations: A New Path to Equity, in BRINGING 
EQUITY BACK 28-35 (Janice Petrovich and Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2004). 
 145. Id. at 31. 
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education.146  The district court indicated that a sound basic education must 
provide not only the skills necessary to vote and serve on a jury, but also to 
obtain substantive employment, and that City students were not provided 
with these skills.147  Furthermore, the court found a causal link between the 
funding of the schools and the deficiencies in the system by showing that 
the schools would improve if the State provided additional funding.148
The Appellate Division in CFE III overturned the lower court’s ruling 
and held that the Education Article requires only a “minimally adequate 
educational opportunity.”
 
149  The Appellate Division further stated that the 
standards used by the trial court were too high to meet this minimal 
standard, and that the state funding system satisfied the constitutional 
minimum.150  The CFE III court indicated that although education must 
take the future employment opportunities of students into account, it can 
only be mandated to the extent that students are able to live independently 
of public assistance, which they were at present.151  Moreover, the court 
stated that the facilities, instrumentalities, and teaching in the city system 
also satisfied the constitutional floor.152  The court noted that, had it found 
inadequacies in the system, the plaintiffs still failed to demonstrate a causal 
link between any such inadequacy and school funding.153  The correct test 
of causation, according to the Appellate Division, was whether the current 
system deprived students of the opportunity to get a sound basic education, 
and not whether more money would help in attaining that goal.154
In 2003, the Court of Appeals took on the task of deciding whether the 
trial court or the intermediate court determined the correct standard and 
 
 
 146. Id. at 32-37. 
 147. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 485 (Sup. Ct. 2001) 
[hereinafter CFE II].  The CFE II court further indicated that a high school level of 
education was necessary in order to complete civic duties and obtain employment. 
 148. Id. at 520. 
 149. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 134 (App. Div. 2002) 
[hereinafter CFE III]. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 138-39.  The court noted that an eighth-grade education was sufficient to 
achieve the goal of civic participation.  The State submitted evidence that understanding 
jury charges requires a grade level of 8.3, and understanding newspaper articles on 
campaign and ballot issues requires a grade level ranging from 6.5 to 11.7.  Plaintiffs’ expert 
disagreed, but did not specify the level needed to complete these tasks.  Id. at 138. 
 152. Id. at 140-43. 
 153. Id. at 138-39. 
 154. Id. at 135-39.  The court further concluded that the problem was not a lack of 
sufficient opportunity to obtain a sound basic education, but rather that the socioeconomic 
problems that many students face hinder their ability to concentrate on their studies, and 
more funding will not address that.  Id. at 144. 
SCHERERCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:07 PM 
2005 SOUND BASIC EDUCATION 119 
facts.155  The Court of Appeals overturned the intermediate court and held 
that the students were not getting a sound basic education under the current 
funding system, pointing to the poor graduation rates as a strong 
indicator.156  The Court of Appeals noted that employment is implicitly 
necessary to a productive citizenry, and that basic employment in today’s 
society requires a full high school education.157
Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that, although teaching and 
instrumentalities were inadequate, poor facilities did not rise to the level of 
inadequacy.
 
158  The court found a causal link by indicating a correlation 
between the present funding system and educational opportunities.159  The 
court further ordered the State to ascertain the actual cost of providing a 
sound basic education in New York City and to ensure a system of 
accountability.160
Despite the order of the Court of Appeals, the State Legislature failed to 
determine the cost of a sound basic education within the one year 
deadline.
 
161  Thus, on August 3, 2004, the judiciary appointed a panel of 
three Judicial Referees to recommend a remedy by November 30, 2004.162
The panel of Judicial Referees focused on what they found to be a strong 
correlation between adequacy of funding and the ability of a school district 
to fulfill the constitutional guarantee.
 
163
 
 155. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 328-29 (N.Y. 2003) 
[hereinafter CFE IV]. 
  They determined that the City 
schools required a phased in, annual infusion of $5.63 billion, to fix 
inadequacies and that $9 billion more was necessary in a capital funding 
 156. Id. at 333-37.  Of New York City-ninth grade students who do not transfer, only 
fifty percent graduate within four years, and thirty percent do not graduate or earn an 
equivalent degree by the age of twenty-one.  Id. at 336. 
 157. Id. at 331. 
 158. Id. at 333-36.  In all, the court found that the inputs in the New York City public 
schools are deficient in providing a sound basic education.  Id. at 336. 
 159. Id. at 336.  The court used the original definition of causation, and agreed that a 
causal link is present if the plaintiffs show “that increased funding can provide better 
teachers, facilities and instrumentalities of learning. . . . [T]his showing, together with 
evidence that such improved inputs yield better student performance,” was sufficient to 
show causation.  Id. (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 319 
(1995)). 
 160. Id. at 348. 
 161. Report and Recommendations of the Judicial Referees at 2, Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2004), 
http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/RefereesFinalReport11.30.04.pdf, [hereinafter Report 
of the Judicial Referees]. 
 162. Id. at 2, 7. 
 163. CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 6. 
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plan.164  The Judicial Referees reiterated that the State bears the “ultimate 
responsibility for the conduct of its agents and the quality of education in 
New York City public schools.”165  The Referees, however, left the 
question as to what extent the State could require the City to contribute to 
the burden as a matter for the Legislature.166  They warned that the 
Legislature could not “thwart the implementation of this Court’s Order by 
being arbitrary or unreasonable in its allocation to the City of New York of 
a funding burden.”167
Justice Leland DeGrasse approved the recommendations of the Judicial 
Referees in CFE V.
 
168  He did not address whether the city should be 
responsible in part for the burden of payment and again deferred to the 
Legislature on this issue.169
Twelve years have passed since the initial filing of CFE v. State in 
1993.
 
170
PART II: IMPLEMENTATION OF SCHOOL FUNDING REFORM IN NEW 
YORK: WHO FOOTS THE BILL, AND IS THAT ENOUGH? 
  In the coming months, the legislature will begin the task of 
allocating funds for school finance reform.  Time will show whether years 
of litigation will result in improved education in New York City. 
A. Introduction 
For over forty years, the legislative and judicial branches of both the 
federal and state governments have been looking for a means of reforming 
troubled education financing systems.171  Though recent methods for 
invalidating these systems have been similar, the implementation of 
educational reform has taken several different courses across the nation, 
with varying results.172
As New York begins to reform its education funding system to provide a 
sound basic education to City students, it may look to the relative success 
of other states’ techniques to measure its own potential success.
 
173
 
 164. Id. 
  The 
 165. Report of the Judicial Referees, supra note 161, § IV ¶ 1. 
 166. Id. § 2, ¶ 6. 
 167. Id. § IV, ¶ 87. 
 168. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar.16, 
2005), http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/degrassefinalorder031505.pdf. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Gosheff,  supra note 12, at 904. 
 171. See generally Gosheff, supra note 12. 
 172. See supra notes 40-93 and accompanying text. 
 173. Id. 
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difficulty of achieving successful reform is twofold.  First, the legislature 
must determine who will pay for the sound basic education, a hotly 
contested issue.  Second, the State must determine how to go about 
implementing the reforms.174
New York City is at a crossroads for education finance reform.  While 
CFE V indicates promise for reform, there also exists a potential for failure.  
Justice DeGrasse’s opinion, as well as the opinion of the Judicial Referees, 
failed to stipulate who was to pay the daunting figure of $5.6 billion per 
year.
 
175  The only guidance they provided was that the City may be 
responsible for a reasonable portion of the expenses and that the State may 
not overburden the City to the point where it cannot provide the funds.176  
The court did not give any indication what it considered a reasonable 
amount.177
B. Support For a Larger Local Contribution 
 
Members of the State government, including Governor Pataki, believe 
that New York City should be responsible for a significant portion 
(approximately forty percent) of the sound basic education funds.178  These 
proponents of a large local contribution point to the “maintenance of effort” 
problem.  Such a problem occurs when the City uses state aid to supplant 
rather than supplement local funding by failing to spend as much on 
education out of its own funds as it did the year before.179  Supporters of 
local contribution contend that a history of maintenance of effort problems 
have, at least partially, caused the degradation of the City school system, 
and thus, the local government should be forced to help fix it.180  The City 
also has limited tax support for education.181
Moreover, proponents of a local contribution argue that if state aid to 
education is generally increased, it will be done at the expense of other 
important state programs and wealthier school districts.
 
182
 
 174. See infra notes 214-50 and accompanying text. 
  If the State 
narrows the funding gap with a reallocation of state aid and/or a revision of 
 175. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text. 
 178. Michael Cooper & David M. Herszenhorn, supra note 7. 
 179. Anker, supra note 94, at 373.  The maintenance of effort problem leads to distorted 
state aid formulas.  See id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. Id. (citing GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE EFFORTS TO REDUCE 
FUNDING GAPS BETWEEN POOR AND WEALTHY DISTRICTS 233 (1997)). 
 182. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 343 (1995) (Simons, 
J., dissenting in part). 
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the state aid formula for New York City, it will be at the expense of other, 
more successful school districts.  Such action will force wealthier districts 
to increase local taxes to make up the difference.183  Advocates of local 
contribution argue that the aforementioned consequences will have an 
unreasonable effect on the rest of the State, given New York City’s history 
of reducing its municipal appropriations for education when provided with 
additional aid.184
Justice Simons, in his dissent in CFE I, articulated the argument for local 
government contribution.
 
 185
Moreover, there is serious doubt that plaintiffs can establish that any 
claimed deficiency in the State funding scheme has caused a deprivation 
of educational opportunity to City students.  These claims against the 
State are presented at a time when New York City is reducing its funding 
to the City School District when measured both in terms of the dollars 
appropriated and the percentage of its municipal budget allocated to 
education (see, Chancellor’s Budget Estimate, 1995-1996, op. cit., at 14).  
And these reductions have occurred even though the City is among 
municipalities having the lowest residential property tax rate for school 
purposes in the State and devotes the lowest percentage of its tax revenue 
to education.  The Chancellor of the City School District has stated that 
the City contributes approximately 20% of its revenues to education, 
whereas the percentage contributed to education by other localities in the 
State is almost twice as much (see, Chancellor’s Budget Estimate, 1995-
1996, op. cit., at 14).  Based upon this evidence, a court could justifiably 
conclude as a matter of law that the shortcomings in the City schools are 
caused by the City’s failure to adequately fund City schools, not from any 
default by the State of its constitutional duty.
  He noted: 
186
C.  Support for a Large or Total State Contribution 
 
Local officials, such as Mayor Bloomberg and the school commissioner, 
Joel Klein, insist that providing a sound basic education is the role of state 
government, that the State should pay for the entire amount, and that any 
effort by the City to contribute will result in the loss of other programs that 
support children as well as public safety.187
 
 183. See id. 
  Proponents of full state 
 184. See id. 
 185. See id. at 341. 
 186. Id.  But see Anker, supra note 94, at 374 (noting that the Legislature set up the 
education system and that if maintenance of effort is a problem, “the Legislature should pass 
a meaningful maintenance of effort law”). 
 187. See Cooper & Herszenhorn, supra note 7. Chancellor Joel Klein focused on one 
footnote in the Report of the Judicial Referees, which noted that the city already has a high 
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funding blame the state share system and the heavy Medicaid burden on the 
City for causing the funding failure.188  Such arguments indicate that the 
share system is flawed because it only takes into account the enrollment 
figures and does not consider the disproportionately large number of 
special needs children in the City.189  They insist that a formulaic number, 
which does not consider the unique factors present, cannot adequately 
provide the necessary aid in a given year.190  Proponents of full state 
funding also note that the State is ultimately responsible for overseeing the 
school districts and boards of education within, and thus are ultimately the 
ones who must bear the fiscal responsibility.191
To assist in the implementation of CFE V, the Citizen’s Budget 
Commission (“CBC”) conducted an analysis to determine who should be 
responsible for footing the bill for a sound basic education.  Under the 
CBC’s analysis the State should be responsible for the full $5.6 billion for 
five reasons.
 
192  First, increased state funding is consistent with long-term 
national trends that recognize the merits of greater amounts of state 
funding.193  As Justice DeGrasse and the Judicial Referees noted, sufficient 
funding is directly correlated to providing a sound basic education.194  
Second, New York State provides less funding as a whole to its localities 
for education than other states; it provides 50.6 percent of the total cost of 
education in New York City, and forty-nine percent throughout the rest of 
the State.195  Third, larger state shares of funding correlate with a lower 
disparity in spending among districts.196  New York State ranks twenty-
fourth in the nation in disparity between wealthy and poor districts.197
Fourth, state taxes in New York are relatively low, while local taxes are 
 
 
tax burden and will have to cut programs if it needs to spend more to support the position 
that the State should contribute fully. Id. (citing Report of Judicial Referees, supra note 161, 
at n.73). 
 188. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 10-11 (pointing to the $4.3 billion the City paid 
to the state in mandated aid for Medicaid as a reason why the City is unable to fund a sound 
basic education). 
 189. See Anker, supra note 94, at 356-59. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 9-12. 
 193. Id. at 9-10. 
 194. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text. 
 195. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 10.  New York ranks thirty-fourth in the nation 
for percentage of state aid to school districts.  Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.  According to the CBC Report, there is a negative correlation between the degree 
of disparity and the spending provided by the state, though the CBC noted that this 
correlation is far from perfect, indicating that other factors may come into play as well.  Id. 
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171 percent higher than the national average.198  New York State requires 
local governments to pay a significant share of expenses related to 
Medicaid and public assistance,199  which accounts for twenty-five percent 
of the difference between New York’s local tax burden and the national 
average.200  In fiscal year 2004, New York City paid $4.3 billion in 
mandated aid to the State for Medicaid, an amount that would have covered 
much of the sound basic education cost.201  The CBC further concluded 
that adding to the already high local tax burden is likely to force cuts in 
services other than education or force high tax increases which will harm 
economic vitality in the City.202
Fifth, the CBC explained that statewide funding is consistent with 
principles of public finance and thus the State should bear the burden.
 
203  
The public finance argument states that education costs should be borne by 
the broadest instrumentality possible.204  It relies on the fact that Americans 
are highly mobile, and may work anywhere in the country.205  Furthermore, 
participation in the political process spans more than local government.206  
The CBC argued that while this may make it seem as if the burden falls on 
the federal government to pay for educational reform, federalism concerns 
are likely to prevent an increase in federal contribution and as such the 
State is the next logical choice.207
The CBC concluded that there are ways for the state to raise the funds 
necessary, and that it was responsible for doing so.
 
208  It provided 
suggestions for increased state funding which included eliminating 
educational inefficiencies through reduction of misallocated aid, better use 
of teacher time, consolidation of smaller districts, and a cap on 
administrative expenses.209
 
 198. Id. at 10-11. 
  The CBC also suggested implementing 
 199. Id. at 11. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 12. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id.; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 208. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 32. 
 209. Id.  A uniform local tax effort involves the State setting a “target per pupil 
expenditure” to provide the average student with a sound basic education.  Id.  The State 
then sets a local tax rate “sufficient to yield a target local share of the target expenditures for 
a district with an average tax base.”  Id.  Next, the State calculates the “mandated 
expenditure requirement for each district using the average per pupil figure and adjusting for 
the characteristics of students and the local cost of living.”  Id.  Lastly, the State makes an 
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Governor Pataki’s plan to increase gambling revenues and restructure 
existing taxes.210
D. Judicial Intervention in Education Reform: Helpful Ally or 
Violation of Separation of Powers? 
 
Though most opponents and proponents of CFE V argue over who shall 
foot the bill, others, including Justice Simmons, purport that it is not the 
role of the judiciary to compel any change in the state aid formula and that 
such action “encroaches on the Legislature’s power to order State priorities 
and allocate the State’s limited resources.”211  Supporters of this view 
called for an appeal to the CFE V decision, which Governor Pataki filed.212  
The State, in CFE V, cited the New York Constitution, Article VII, section 
7 which provides: “No money shall ever be paid out of the State treasury 
funds, or any other funds under its management, except in pursuant of an 
appropriation by law. . .” to support their argument that the judiciary is 
over-reaching its power in mandating that $5.6 billion dollars be 
appropriated to New York City for education.213  The Court of Appeals, in 
deeming the funding system unconstitutional, held that “it is the province 
of the Judicial branch to define and safeguard rights provided by the New 
York State Constitution, and order redress for violation of them.”214
 
aid payment to each district “equal to the difference between its mandated expenditure 
requirement and its mandated minimum tax effort.”  Id.  This shifts the funding from local 
property taxes to statewide revenues, and is quicker to achieve than full state funding.  Id. at 
8-9. 
  Thus, 
the court held that the recommendations of the Judicial Referees did not 
 210. See id. at 32-33.  The CBC Report indicated that expanded gambling could generate 
approximately $2 billion annually for education, but that this increase should be restricted to 
destination casinos and promoted reasonably, to avoid a negative impact on low income 
citizens.  The CBC Report further suggested enforcing the current sales tax on internet 
transactions and other exempt items.  Id. 
 211. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 343 (1995) (Simons, 
J., dissenting in part). 
 212. The decision was met with some resistence.  See Letter from Anthony D. Weiner, 
Charles B. Rangel, Jerrold Nadler, Major R. Owens, Jose E. Serrano, Carolyn Maloney, 
Joseph Crowley, Gregory W. Meeks, and Edolphus Towns, Members of Congress, to 
George Pataki, Governor,  New York State (Feb. 23, 2005) (requesting that the State refrain 
from appealing and work to improve the schools), available at http://www.cfequity.org/02-
24-05letter.htm [hereinafter Letter to Governor Pataki]. 
 213. Motion Consolidation at 3, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/whatsnew/pdf/CFE-2.pdf. 
 214. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 925 (2003); see also, 
Klosterman v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 535 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing the distinction 
“between a court’s imposition of its own policy determination upon its governmental 
partners and its mere declaration and enforcement of . . . rights”). 
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violate the separation of powers doctrine and the argument was inconsistent 
with current law.215
E. Schools for New York’s Future Act 
 
A fourth approach recently surfaced that combined the concerns of the 
supporters of total state funding and supporters of a large local 
contribution.  On June 3, 2005, Assemblyman Steven Sanders, chairman of 
the New York State Assembly’s Education Committee, introduced a bill 
known as the Schools for New York’s Future Act (Future Act).216  The 
proposed bill, authored in part by the CFE, set forth a formula for state and 
local contribution shares as well as accountability provisions.217  The bill, 
if passed in the upcoming legislative session by the State Senate, could 
bring changes to New York City school children as early as the upcoming 
school year.218
The proposed Future Act establishes a base funding level of 
approximately $8000 per student for all schools in the State.
 
219  The 
entitlement for each school district is then calculated by multiplying the 
base amount by the district’s average daily membership, and in doing so, 
weighting low income students, English language learners, and students 
with disabilities.220  The formula allows each student to qualify for one or 
more weighting category.221
 
 215. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 925-31 (2003). 
  Calculations are adjusted each year based on 
 216. See Press Release, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Assemblyman Sanders Introduces 
Schools for New York’s Future Act for Passage in Current Legislative Session, at 
http://www.cfequity.org/06-07-05sandersbill.htm (June 7, 2005). 
 217. Id.  The accountability provisions require all districts not meeting the eighty percent 
successful school district standard, including New York City, to develop a four year 
comprehensive sound basic education plan with annual updates to improve student 
performance and eliminate achievement gaps.  The comprehensive plan would address 
needs in the quality of teaching and instructional leadership; appropriate class sizing; 
adequacy of school facilities; pre-kindergarten services; services to at risk students; 
instrumentalities of learning; parental involvement and responsibility; and the need for a 
safe orderly learning environment.  The part of the plan which dealt specifically with 
teacher’s issues addressed competitive pay scales, teacher recruitment and retention, 
equitable distribution of experienced teachers, and improvements of teaching quality.  These 
annual reports required will be made available to all members of the public in district offices 
and on the internet.  H.R. A8700 §1302(7), 2005-06 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY, MAJOR PROVISIONS: SCHOOLS FOR NEW YORK’S 
FUTURE ACT,  at http://www.nysecb.org/news/050323schoolsfuture02.html (Mar. 23, 2005). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id.  The total figure is then determined and multiplied by the Cost of Education 
Index developed through the New York Adequacy Study and by a sparsity factor to arrive at 
the Sound Basic Education amount for each district.  Id. 
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population, and changes to state and local contributions are adjusted 
accordingly.222
The proportion of the sound basic education funding that should be paid 
by the State and by the locality are also determined by a formula under the 
Future Act.
 
223
PART III: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF CFE V. STATE IN NEW 
YORK CITY: POLITICS AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT 
  The figure is then adjusted to reflect poverty levels in the 
district.  This local contribution is expected from all districts and is 
mandated for those that are not providing a sound basic education, 
including New York City.  The five major cities, including New York City, 
and twenty other districts in New York, would be subject to the mandatory 
contribution requirement for the first year. 
A. Introduction 
Policy is not self-executing.  As history shows, school finance reform is 
difficult to implement, even with laudable goals and well-intentioned 
judicial action.224  Thus, triumph in a system as unique and complex as the 
New York City public school system is sure to be an uphill battle.225
While the State wants the City to contribute forty percent, City officials 
believe that the State should pay the entire $5.6 billion.
  
Successful narrowing of the achievement gap for New York City students 
requires a resolution of who should pay for a sound basic education 
coupled with public and political support. 
226  Governor Pataki 
has already expressed his plans to file an appeal, CFE V, rather than a 
proposal for school funding within the ninety-day period given by the 
court.227
 
 222. Id. 
  If CFE V returns to the appeals process, the children of New York 
City will continue to be deprived of the funding the court determined as 
 223. Id.  The contribution ratio is based on the average of the ratio of the district’s 
property wealth per pupil to the statewide average property wealth per pupil and the ratio of 
the district’s income per pupil to the statewide average income per pupil.  “This 
determination would be made in accordance with the definition of a successful district, 
which was established by the Regents and endorsed by the court.”  Id. 
 224. See supra notes 40-93 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 94-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the complexities 
of the New York City public schools. 
 226. See supra notes 178-210 and accompanying text. 
 227. See, e.g., Errol A. Cockfield Jr., Now, It’s a Math Problem. Legislators Haggle Over 
Where to Get the Billions of Dollars Needed to Fund the City’s School System, NEWSDAY, 
Feb. 16, 2005, at A4; Greg Winter, Judge Orders Billions in Aid to City Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at A1. 
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necessary to obtain a constitutionally guaranteed sound basic education.228
An appeal of CFE V is unlikely to overturn the holding on separation of 
powers grounds.
 
229
B. Grass Roots Support, Rather Than Polarity, Will Thwart 
Opposition to Reform 
  Though Governor Pataki continues to claim that the 
case should be thrown out because the judiciary lacks the power to mandate 
the Legislature to allocate funds for education, the prior CFE cases have 
made it clear that the court has the jurisdiction to decide this case and to 
mandate appropriate remedies.  Therefore, any such argument is likely to 
fail, and will only result in stagnation of education reform in New York 
City. 
On appeal, the only further role the courts can play is to determine the 
eventual remedy and allocate the payment burden.  The courts, however, 
are not the appropriate forum to produce a successful result.  Polar or 
arbitrary answers to the payment question are unreasonable, impractical, 
and unlikely to further school finance reform.  If the state becomes one 
hundred percent responsible for funding education, the City will be able to 
shirk responsibility for having misallocated funds in years past.230  If the 
Legislature or the courts accept a full state contribution as reasonable, then 
the State will be forced to reallocate funds away from successful districts, 
and/or increase taxes, while the city evades responsibly for poor 
management of State aid in the past.231  An approach that takes money 
from suburban citizens and gives it to poor urban districts’ citizens is likely 
to meet public opposition, as it did in New Jersey.232  Acknowledging the 
concerns of suburban and wealthy district residents and appealing to their 
self-interests may thwart some of this opposition.233
The State, given its constitutional obligation to provide its citizens with 
a sound basic education, will be responsible for at least a portion of the 
annual $5.6 billion.  As such, residents outside of New York City will be at 
least partly responsible for the education of the children in the urban 
system.  The best way to avoid suburban backlash is to show how a 
 
 
 228. See Letter to Governor Pataki, supra note 212 (requesting that the State refrain from 
appealing and work to improve the schools). 
 229. Any appeal is likely to be remanded to the trial court to determine the relevant 
standard of facts and eventual remedy, bringing the case to come full circle without having 
brought any relief for the children of New York City.  See supra note 155. 
 230. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra notes 52-53, 182-86 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 52-53, 182-86 and accompanying text. 
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reformed school finance system in New York can help protect and expand 
interests outside of New York City.  As former Governor Cuomo noted, the 
wealthier districts will be hard-pressed to stand behind reforms that they 
feel have no bearing on them other than to raise their taxes.234
Acknowledging the concerns of suburban and wealthy district residents 
and avoiding a pure “Robin Hood” approach will appeal to residents of 
these districts without threatening their own self-interests.  In prior 
suburban forums, discussions led the residents of such communities to 
understand the plight of urban citizens, encouraging them to work towards 
reform in urban areas.  The significance of previous public engagement 
efforts, in the earlier stages of CFE V, and the importance of continuing 
this process are evident in an editorial published in an affluent suburban 
county newspaper: 
 
This “public engagement process” is an exciting one.  It includes 
hundreds of parents, teachers, administrators, advocates, and 
representatives of civic, religious, business, and labor groups from across 
the state exchanging ideas on critical issues, including how funding 
reform can dovetail with state Board of Regents’ effort to raise academic 
standards . . . . The plan . . . is to offer participants an opportunity to 
directly influence reform positions [CFE] will present to the court.  That 
in itself is refreshing.  After years of watching state officials . . . avoid this 
admittedly difficult but vital area of reform, it’s high time the fiscal 
inequalities of the education system were addressed. And the fact that the 
public isn’t being bypassed is heartening.235
Active community involvement in reform has been a major determinant 
of success in education adequacy cases.
 
236
A large City contribution, such as the forty percent arbitrarily picked by 
Governor Pataki, is also unreasonable and unlikely to provide successful 
reform.  If the legislature chooses to obtain forty percent of sound basic 
education funds from the City, there is likely to be public backlash as well.  
Such a requirement, as indicated by the CBC Report, will force the City to 
cut back on important programs.
  Advocates can improve public 
opinion through collaborative effort and by continuing the community 
dialogue process.  Thus, the political process will dictate the result. 
237
 
 234. See Anker, supra note 94, at 365.  “[T]he public will not support the education of 
other people’s children unless it is in their self-interest—it raises economic productivity, 
decreases social disorientation and is much less expensive in the long term than the 
alternative.”  Id. 
  It also fails to consider that the City 
 235. Rebell, supra note 144, at 35. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See supra note 187-91 and accompanying text. 
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pays substantial funds to the State for programs such as Medicaid.238  
Furthermore, a forty-percent local contribution is contrary to the court’s 
order, which indicated that the state cannot thwart the implementation of 
reform by requiring an arbitrary or unreasonably high contribution from the 
City.239  Ultimately, the State is responsible for providing the sound basic 
education, and cannot evade this responsibility by placing a high burden on 
the local government.240
The State has various means for raising revenues to support a fairly large 
contribution to a sound basic education.  As the CBC Report indicated, the 
State can raise the money through a reduction of inefficiencies in the 
education system, expanded gambling revenues, and improved enforcement 
of sales tax and taxes on professional services.
  Putting almost half of the education burden on the 
locality, rather than with the State, is sure to meet opposition as 
unreasonable. 
241  Of important note, 
however, is the possible public resistance toward the method of raising 
revenues for education through gambling.  If the State does as promised, 
and promotes gambling at vacation-type casinos with responsible 
promotion, public concerns can be alleviated.242  Furthermore, the New 
York State Lottery, a form of gambling, already contributes a large amount 
to education funding, providing a stable base for state aid.243
The real question, therefore, comes in determining what constitutes a 
reasonable contribution.  Through the proposed Future Act, the 
collaborative Campaign for Fiscal Equity went a step further by setting out 
a formula to calculate local contribution.
 
244  The Future Act also addressed 
concerns by promoting continued community engagement to determine the 
regional and local needs of school children.245  Since collaborative efforts 
by the Campaign for Fiscal Equity have been successful in defining a 
sound basic education, and in defining the skills education should provide, 
there is reason to believe that an effort by the CFE to determine a 
reasonable share will be appropriate and most likely to lead to successful 
implementation.246
 
 238. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 11. 
  The legislature should strongly consider adopting the 
 239. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text. 
 242. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103 at 17-18. 
 243. See H. CARL MCCALL, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, THE 
NEW YORK LOTTERY ROLE IN FINANCING EDUCATION (1998), available at 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/schools/1998/4-98.htm#raiser (last visited Nov. 8, 2005). 
 244. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text. 
 245. H.R. A8700, §1302(6), 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005). 
 246. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. 
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Future Act, which is based on the recommendations of the CFE, to 
implement CFE V. 
If CFE V returns to Justice DeGrasse on appeal, the court may be forced 
to assign a percentage of contribution by the State and local governments, 
thereby fueling the separation of powers debate.247  Judicial activism of this 
extent has in the past been met with significant opposition from the 
executive and legislative branches, and the public.248  Animosity toward 
judicial activism slowed implementation of the Abbott mandate in New 
Jersey, and halted education reform in West Virginia.249  Thus, for New 
York to determine contribution shares for state and local government that 
are reasonable enough to gain widespread support, additional public 
engagement is imperative.  Such grassroots effort, such as that of the 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, proved successful in implementation of school 
finance reform in Kentucky.250
B. Increased School Funding Without Increased Accountability is 
Not Enough 
 
School finance reformers can also learn many lessons from the 
implementation of KERA.251  It is at the implementation stage where 
school reforms rise and fall.252  Therefore, reformers must be aware of the 
state and local governments’ goals and the public’s opinion.253  Barriers 
must be addressed rather than ignored, and barriers exist at the policy, 
administrative, and practice levels.254
To ensure positive change, the legislature must consider how the money 
will be spent.  Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Future Act is that 
it addresses accountability.  The importance of accountability is twofold.  
First, money alone is unlikely to provide the reaching reform that City 
schools need to provide a sound basic education.
  Under KERA, a comprehensive 
approach which takes such factors into account, in addition to increased 
funding, helped make it one of the most successful school finance reform 
programs in recent history. 
255
 
 247. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text. 
  Second, ensuring 
accountability is likely to ease the minds of some supporters of large local 
 248. See, e.g., notes 68-79 and accompanying text. 
 249. See, e.g., notes 68-79 and accompanying text. 
 250. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text. 
 255. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 22. 
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contribution, who are concerned with abuse of state funding at the city 
level.256  In addressing the effective use of resources, the comprehensive 
sound basic education plan under the Future Act will identify barriers to 
implementation on an annual basis through an ongoing public engagement 
process.  Involving members of the public at all levels would greatly 
increase the likelihood of success.  The proposed Future Act would require 
the public engagement process to determine what the significant barriers 
are.  Evidence suggests that increasing aid unaccompanied by substantive 
reforms will not produce the desired improvement.257
As the Citizen’s Budget Commission noted in their report on New York 
City schools, there are several inefficient areas which, if corrected, could 
contribute significantly to providing a sound basic education for students 
both financially and academically.
 
258  Furthermore, contractual provisions 
prevent administrators and principals from using increased numbers of 
teachers to reduce class size and improve education.259  As seen in 
Kentucky, great funding gains can be offset by a lack of change in 
efficiency and allocation, something New York needs to take into 
consideration in implementing the CFE V mandated reform.260
Therefore, the State must first use community dialogue and open 
collaborative efforts such as those initiated by the CFE to define a 
reasonable percentage of City contribution for sound basic education that 
the public and government can both support.  In addressing public and 
administrative barriers to implementation, the State should be mindful of 
the concerns of both urban and suburban residents. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The State is in a position to raise the funds, and has a responsibility to its 
citizens to provide a sound basic education.  It cannot simply place this 
burden on a locality such as New York City and claim that it should bear 
nearly half of the cost.  The legislature must be reasonable in its allocation 
of education funding both from the State and local governments.  As earlier 
rounds of CFE V have shown, community dialogue and collaboration 
between suburban and urban residents can help bring about change for 
children throughout New York. 
Governor Pataki has stated that he wishes to appeal the decision in 
 
 256. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. 
 257. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 22. 
 258. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text. 
 259. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 29-30. 
 260. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
SCHERERCHRISTENSEN 2/3/2011  10:07 PM 
2005 SOUND BASIC EDUCATION 133 
opposition to several Congressmen and members of the public.  Additional 
appeals will only slow judicial efficiency, create costs for all parties, and 
create a barrier for learning in New York City.  The next step in the CFE 
process is not in the courtroom, but in the public arena, ensuring that 
children across New York City are given the chance to succeed, beginning 
with a sound basic education. 
 
